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Abstract 
The adoption of network codes is a crucial step towards the conclusion of the internal energy market 
by the year 2014. This paper aims to assess the availability of judicial review in the multi-stage 
procedure established by the Electricity and Gas Regulations. In this respect, it first provides a brief 
overview of the establishment of the European Networks of TSOs (ENTSOs), whose expertise serves 
as the basis for the elaboration of the network codes. Subsequently, it critically assesses the three-stage 
adoption procedure set in the Regulations. The analysis then shifts to a more normative dimension 
through the examination of the legal characterization of the basic acts involved in the adoption 
procedure, namely, the framework guidelines and network codes, and of the availability of judicial 
review. 
Keywords 
ACER, Comitology, Delegated Acts, ENTSO-E/G, Framework Guidelines, Judicial Review, Legal 
Characterization, Network Codes, Preparatory Act. 
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I. Introduction* 
Despite being amongst the least mediatised elements of the third energy package, the adoption of 
common network codes figures as its most promising one
1
 against the background of inadequate 
market integration identified by the 2007 Sector Inquiry
2
. The adoption of network codes is, indeed, a 
key component on the road towards the envisaged conclusion of the internal energy market by the year 
2014
3
 and a core priority for the institutions involved in the meantime. The magnitude of the task, its 
importance for the European energy market, as well as, the interesting legal questions it gives rise to 
render it a challenging topic suitable for in-depth examination. 
The present paper aims to assess one of the legal questions arising from the currently ongoing 
process of the adoption of network codes, namely, the availability of judicial review. In this respect, it 
will, firstly, provide an overview of the fora of institutionalized cooperation among the Transmission 
System Operators (TSOs), namely, the European Networks of Transmission System Operators 
(ENTSOs), whose expertise serves as the basis for the drafting of the codes and, secondly, critically 
present the three-stage adoption procedure set by Regulations (EC) 714/2009 and 715/2009 
(Electricity and Gas Regulations). The analysis then shifts to the more normative dimension of the 
legal characterization of the acts adopted during the three-stage procedure and the availability of 
judicial review. 
II. The Legislative framework for the adoption of network codes 
A. European Networks of TSOs for the Elaboration of Network Codes  
The Gas and Electricity Regulations provide for the adoption of network codes through a procedure 
based on the institutional interplay among the European Commission, the Agency for the Cooperation 
of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the ENTSOs. The latter are entrusted with a central role in the 
drafting of the network codes given their considerable technical expertise and have traditionally been 
at the heart of the establishment of common technical rules. For this reason, prior to focusing on the 
procedure itself, we will examine the framework for their cooperation as established under the third 
energy package.  
The cooperation of Transmission System Operators is not a novel phenomenon
4
; on the contrary, 
voluntary cooperation associations
5
 already dated many years of life before the adoption of the third 
package, while the Florence and Madrid Fora have also represented crucial platforms of informal 
                                                     
*
 The article is based on an intervention made at the 9th International Conference on the European Energy Market 
(EEM12) in Florence (May 2012). The author would like to sincerely thank Dr. K. Sardis and Mr. D. Lelovitis from the 
Greek Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE) and the anonymous reviewers of the EEM12 conference for their valuable 
comments on earlier drafts of the paper. Any errors or omissions are of the author’s sole responsibility. 
1
 See An. Piebalgs, “Europe’s New Energy Policy”, in Europe’s New Energy Policy, An. Piebalgs, Ed. Leuven: 
Claeys&Casteels, 2009, pp. 20.  
2
 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission, Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Reports), 10.01.2007, COM(2006) 851 final. 
3
 See European Council, Conclusions of the 4th of February 2011, EUCO 2/1/11. Online. Available: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119175.pdf. 
4
 See C. Musialski, “The ENTSOs Under the Third Energy Package”, in EU Energy Law and Policy Issues, B. Delvaux, 
M. Hunt, K. Talus, Ed. Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland: Intersentia, 2012, pp. 33. 
5
 Such as the Union for Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCPTE) and the European Transmission System 
Operators (ETSO) in the field of electricity and Gas Transmission Europe (GTE) in the field of gas. 
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discussion and cooperation among TSOs and other stakeholders
6
. More recently, the Regional 
Initiatives equally played an important role in ensuring full compliance with the European legislative 
framework and removing technical and legal barriers from the markets
7
. However, faced with the 
deficiencies identified in the 2007 Sector Inquiry, the adoption of the third energy package marked a 
turning point for the cooperation of TSOs in several respects.  
First of all, it introduced, for the first time, a specific legal basis for the cooperation of TSOs with 
each other in the article 4 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations and provided for the establishment of 
ENTSO-E and ENTSO-G in the article 5 of the Electricity and the Gas Regulations. As a result, the 
ENTSO-E has been established in December 2008 and is operational since the 1
st
 July 2009, having 
replaced all former TSO associations in Europe
8
 and aiming to “complete the internal market for 
electricity and to ensure optimal management, coordinated operation and sound technical evolution of 
the electricity network
9”. Respectively, the ENTSO- G has been established in December 2009 with 
the same aim in the field of gas
10. The Regulations remain “minimalistic” with regard to the specific 
organization of the ENTSOs
11
, which allowed their setting up under the, flexible and common for 
TSOs, form of an international non-profit Association (AISBL) governed by Belgian law
12
. A 
comparative examination of the ENTSOs reveals differences both in terms of the available status of 
participation for TSOs and their institutional structure.  
In particular, the ENTSO-E has been established by its Founding Members with the possibility to 
admit new members under specific requirements by a decision of its Assembly
13
. The participation of 
TSOs of third countries as members
14
 reflects the recognition of their importance for the good 
functioning of the EU electricity market for technical and market reasons
15
. It should be noted that all 
ENTSO-E members, non-EU ones included, participate in the network code drafting process and have 
the right to vote
16
. Additionally, the status of observer can be attributed to candidates which act as 
                                                     
6
 The most accomplished outcome of this cooperation are the rules developed within the Florence Forum with respect to cross-border 
trade, congestion management, transparency and tariff principles, as well as, the Guidelines for Good Practice developed by the Madrid 
Forum, which ultimately formed the basis for Regulations (EC) 1228/2003 and (EC) No 1775/2005. On the key strengths and 
weaknesses of the “Forum concept”, see P. Cameron, Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation. Implementing the New Directives on 
Electricity and Gas Across Europe, OUP: Oxford, 2005, p. 75. 
7
 See http://www.acer.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ACER_ HOME/Activities/ Regional_Initiatives. 
8
 Namely ETSO, ATSOI, BALTSO, NORDEL, UCTE, UKTSOA.  
9
 See article 4 of the Electricity Regulation. 
10
 See article 4 of the Gas Regulation. 
11
 No specific requirements are set apart from the obligation of regional cooperation within the context of the ENTSOs 
established under the article 12 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. 
12
 See articles 2 par. 1, 3 AoA ENTSO-G, article 1 par. 2 AoA ENTSO-E. Since the ENTSOs essentially constitute 
professional associations that could be prone to collusion particular attention is due to EU competition law which remains 
applicable to their decisions, see recitals 7 and 16 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations respectively. 
13
 See article 6 AoA. See also ACER, Opinion on the ENTSO-E Statutes, Rules of Procedure and List of Members, 
05.05.11, pp. 3-5, discussing alternative approaches for the admission of new members regarding TSOs from EU 
Member States and third countries. Online. Available: 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ACER_HOME/Public_Docs/Acts%20of%20the%20Agency/Opinions/2011 
14
 A typical example in this respect is Swissgrid, which plays a key role in the functioning of the EU electricity grid and is 
currently a member of the ENTSO-E. 
15
 The Electricity and Gas Regulations acknowledge this fact in their article 8 par. 3 entrusting the ENTSOs with the task of 
adopting recommendations relating to the « coordination of technical cooperation between Community and third-country 
transmission system operators ». 
16
 Article 12 par. 6 AoA clarifies that the voting power of TSOs from third countries is calculated as if they were members 
of the European Union. However, the Assembly is, at the same time, bound to « ensure that the total sum of the voting 
rights of Members from countries that are not members of the European Union will not exceed 28% of the First Part of 
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TSOs and create a “reasonable expectation” that they will qualify for membership in the near future 
following an assessment by the Association based on technical, regulatory and market conditions
17
. 
Observers have the right to attend the meetings of the Assembly without voting rights
18
, they may be 
invited by a body of the Association to appoint representatives to its meetings, be provided with 
information and publications of the Association
19
 and are subject to financial obligations
20
. 
On the contrary, the ENTSO-G distinguishes between three status of participation. First of all, new 
members may be admitted upon decision of the General Assembly provided that they are TSOs
21
. 
Secondly, the status of an Associated Partner may be attributed by decision of the General Assembly 
to TSOs from Member States to which apply the derogations and exemptions of the article 30 of the 
Gas Regulation in conjunction with article 49 of the Directive 2009/73/EC, such as Latvia and 
Lithuania
22
. This status allows the attendance of the meetings of the General Assembly without voting 
rights, the participation in Working Groups, to the extent allowed by the Board, and entails financial 
obligations
23
. Finally, TSOs from countries that are candidates for accession to the EU, parties to the 
Energy Community Treaty or parties to the Convention establishing the European Free Trade 
Association can be designated as Observers by decision of the General Assembly
24
. This status allows 
the attendance of meetings of the General Assembly without voting rights and may lead to financial 
obligations
25
. 
In terms of institutional structure, the ENTSO-E presents an increased complexity compared to its 
gas homologue
26
; it comprises the Assembly and the Board, as well as four Committees in crucial 
areas of electricity
27
, a Legal and Regulatory Group composed of experts from each Member
28
, 
Regional Groups
29
 and a Secretariat
30
.  
The Assembly is the general leading body of the Association enjoying residual power. It is 
responsible for decisions concerning the functioning of the Association as well as for transmission 
system matters of a major strategic, financial or other significance for TSOs, among which, the 
development of network codes
31
. The Annual Assembly is held in the second quarter of each calendar 
year and extraordinary meetings may also be held under certain conditions
32
. The voting system 
(Contd.)                                                                  
the Voting Power and/or 35% of the Second Part of the Voting Power », reducing proportionately their voting power in 
case one or both of these thresholds are exceeded. 
17
 See article 7 AoA. 
18
 See article 12 par. 4 AoA. 
19
 See article 7 AoA. 
20
 See article 19 par. 3 AoA. 
21
 See article 7 par. 1 AoA. Pursuant to article 1 par. 42 AoA, TSOs are defined by reference to article 10 of the Directive 
2009/73/EC. 
22
 See article 9a par. 1 AoA. 
23
 See article 9a par. 2, 9a par. 5 and 36 par. 4 AoA. 
24
 See article 9d par. 1 AoA. 
25
 See articles 9d par. 2, 5 and 36 par. 4 AoA. 
26
 See article 11 AoA. 
27
 Namely, the System Development Committee, the System Operations Committee, the Market Committee and the 
Research and Development Committee, see article 15 AoA. 
28
 See article 16 AoA. The Legal and Regulatory Group is entrusted with an advisory role towards the other bodies of the 
ENTSO-E on legal issues and with the task of ensuring legal and regulatory compliance of the Association’s activities.  
29
 See article 17 AoA. 
30
 It also acknowledges Voluntary Regional Groups, see article 17 par. 2 AoA. 
31
 See article 12 par. 2 AoA. 
32
 See article 12 par. 5 AoA. 
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applied provides for a voting power of each member composed of two parts
33
, the first attributing 
equal voting weight to each member according to the “one country, one vote” principle, and, the 
second voting weight reflecting the comparative weight of each member in view of its population. 
Pursuant to article 12 par. 7 of the Articles of Association (AoA), the Assembly aims to achieve 
unanimity of all voting power present or represented. If that is not possible, it decides by simple 
majority except for specific cases where a special voting procedure is provided for or a special 
majority is necessary; such a special majority is applicable in the case of network codes
34
.  
The second most important body of the ENTSO-E, the Board, is composed of maximum twelve 
members appointed by the Assembly for a term of two years, renewable once
35
. It is entrusted, among 
other tasks, with the coordination of the work of and between the Committees and the Legal and 
Regulatory Group and the follow-up and execution of the decisions of the Assembly
36
. 
On the contrary, the institutional structure of the ENTSO-G is fairly simple, comprising the 
General Assembly and the Board
37
. The General Assembly is here again the general leading body, 
enjoying residual power and being entrusted with a series of responsibilities
38
, including, the adoption 
of network codes. It has an ordinary meeting at least twice within a calendar year, while extraordinary 
meetings may also be held under certain conditions
39
. In terms of voting process, a two-tier system is 
set
40
, the first part conferring equal voting weight to each Member State represented in the Association 
and the second conferring voting weight reflecting the population of Member States and the status of 
certain among them as “countries of a special EU grid connection significance”. With respect to the 
decision-making processes, the General Assembly uses two types, depending on whether the decision 
is taken on a single proposal or whether there is a choice to be made among more
41
. Decisions such as 
the adoption of network codes require a simple majority
42
, namely the approval by votes cast by 
members present or represented representing at least sixty per cent of both the first and the second part 
of the voting rights cast
43
.  
The second body of the ENTSO-G, the Board, is composed of a minimum of three up to a 
maximum of twelve persons, elected by the General Assembly for an official term of three years
44
. It 
is entrusted with a series of responsibilities, among which, notably, day-to-day management tasks, 
representation tasks, the preparation of the meetings of the General Assembly, the proposal to the 
latter of draft resolutions and the proposal of draft network codes
45
.  
                                                     
33
 See article 12 par. 6 AoA. 
34
 As well as for the amendment of the AoA and the Internal Regulations and the dissolution of the Association, see article 
12 par. 7 AoA. 
35
 See article 13 par. 1, 2 AoA. 
36
 See article 13 par. 5 AoA. 
37
 See article 10 AoA. A General Manager and Business Area Managers, as well as Subject Managers are designated upon a 
non binding recommendation of the Board, pursuant to article 33 par. 1, 5 AoA and article 15 of the Rules of Procedure 
and article 34 and article 16 of the Rules of Procedure respectively. Working Groups may also be established by the 
General Assembly, see article 35 AoA and article 19 of the Rules of Procedure. 
38
 See article 11 par. 3 AoA. 
39
 See article 12 AoA. 
40
 See article 17 AoA. 
41
 See article 19 par. 3 AoA. 
42
 Special majority is required for amendments to the AoA, see article 37 par. 4 AoA, and the dissolution of the 
Association, see article 38 par. 4 AoA. 
43
 A special majority is required for decisions such as the amendment of the AoA and the dissolution of the Association, see 
articles 37 par. 4, 38 par. 4 AoA.  
44
 See articles 22 par. 1, 2, 24 par. 2 AoA. 
45
 See articles 23, 32 AoA. 
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The second major change under the third energy package regarding the cooperation of all TSOs is 
the obligatory participation of the latter in the ENTSOs, pursuant to article 4 of the Electricity and Gas 
Regulations, which lays in sharp contrast with the voluntary nature of previous cooperation schemes. 
As ACER has observed membership to the ENTSOs is “not an option but a legal obligation for 
TSOs”, therefore, “TSOs should also have the right to be admitted to (ENTSOs) after meeting the 
membership conditions
46
.  
Finally, apart from being statutorily defined, the tasks assigned to the ENTSOs are also much 
broader than those of previous cooperation schemes. In particular, the ENTSOs have been entrusted, 
apart from the elaboration of network codes whose examination will follow, with the adoption of 
common network operation tools and research plans, the adoption of community-wide TYNDPs, of 
recommendations on the technical cooperation of EU and third-country TSOs, annual work plans, 
reports and annual summer and winter supply (generation adequacy in the case of electricity) 
outlooks
47
.  
Having examined the framework for the cooperation of TSOs, mainly in charge for the elaboration 
of network codes, the focus of the paper now turns to the exact procedure for their adoption. 
B. A Three-stage Procedure for the Adoption of Network Codes 
The adoption of common network codes follows an essentially three-stage procedure involving an 
institutional interplay among the ENTSOs, the ACER and the Commission
48
 and allowing for 
extensive consultations with stakeholders
49
. The procedure is designed so as to take advantage of the 
technical expertise of the ENTSOs, which are mainly responsible for the drafting, while at the same 
time ensuring regulatory review from the ACER, and a legally binding outcome through the adoption 
by comitology from the Commission. In comparison to technical rules adopted in the context of 
previous cooperation schemes the adoption of network codes under the third package represents 
significant progress in two respects
50
; firstly, network codes are adopted in more areas than previous 
technical rules. Secondly, their adoption by comitology renders them legally binding for all market 
participants contrary to the previous practice of the adoption of technical rules through contractual 
agreements among TSOs. 
More in detail, the procedure begins with the establishment of an annual priority list by the 
Commission after consultation with the ACER, the ENTSOs and other relevant stakeholders
51
. In this 
respect, network codes are developed in specific areas, defined in article 8 par. 6 of the Electricity and 
Gas Regulations, namely, (a) network security and reliability rules (including rules for technical 
transmission reserve capacity for operational network security in the case of electricity), (b) network 
connection rules, (c) third-party access rules, (d) data exchange and settlement rules, (e) 
interoperability rules, (f) operational procedures in an emergency, (g) capacity allocation and 
congestion management rules, (h) rules for trading related to technical and operational provision of 
network access services and system balancing, (i) transparency rules, (j) balancing rules (including 
                                                     
46
 See ACER, Opinion on the ENTSO-E Statutes, Rules of Procedure and List of Members, 05.05.11, p. 4, ACER, Opinion 
on the ENTSOG Statutes, rules of Procedure and the List of Members, 05.05.11, p. 4. Online. Available: 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ACER_HOME/Public_Docs/Acts%20of%20the%20Agency/Opinions/2011 
47
 See article 8 par. 3 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. 
48
 See Fl. Gräper, Ch. Schoser, “The Establishment of Common Network Codes”, in EU Energy Law, Volume 1, The 
Internal Energy Market, The Third Liberalization Package, 3rd Edition, Chr. Jones, Ed. Leuven: Claeys&Casteels, 2010, 
p. 496. 
49
 Apart from the importance of stakeholders’ input for the elaboration phase, consultations could also facilitate the 
subsequent acceptance of network codes from the energy sector. 
50
 See C. Musialski, op.cit., p. 60. 
51
 See article 6 par. 1 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. 
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network-related reserve power rules in the case of electricity / network-related rules on nominations 
procedure, rules for imbalance charges and rules for operational balancing between transmission 
system operators’ systems in the case of gas), (k) rules regarding harmonized transmission tariff 
structures (including locational signals and inter-transmission system operator compensation rules in 
the case of electricity), (l) energy efficiency regarding electricity / gas networks. It should be noted, 
that ENTSOs can adopt by themselves network codes that are not included in the areas defined by the 
annual priority list
52
. 
After the establishment of the priority list, the Commission requests ACER to establish a 
framework guideline within an extendable timeline of six months and following a two-month period of 
consultation with stakeholders
53
. The framework guideline sets clear and objective principles on which 
the network code will be subsequently developed and must contribute to non-discrimination, effective 
competition and the efficient functioning of the market
54
. If the Commission considers that these 
objectives are not achieved it may request ACER to review the framework guideline and resubmit it
55
. 
In case ACER fails to submit or re-submit it, the Commission ultimately ensures its elaboration 
itself
56
. The Commission then requests the ENTSOs to develop a network code in line with the 
framework guideline within a maximum period of twelve months to be submitted to ACER
57
. This 
represents the current stage of the most advanced of the ongoing procedures since the ENTSO-G has 
recently submitted the first network code on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms (CAM) to ACER
58
. 
ACER then gives a reasoned opinion on the draft network code developed by the ENTSOs within 
three months, following consultation with the relevant stakeholders
59
, and may request them to amend 
and resubmit it. It will finally submit the network code to the Commission recommending its adoption 
once it is in line with the framework guidelines
60
. It should be noted that if the ENTSOs have failed to 
develop the network code within the above-mentioned time period, the Commission may ask ACER to 
prepare a draft network code itself following consultation and submit it for adoption
61
. 
The final stage of the procedure is the adoption of the network code from the Commission by 
comitology and, in particular, through the regulatory procedure with scrutiny
62
. Nevertheless, the 
                                                     
52
 Since they do not follow the typical procedure ending up in their adoption by comitology, these network codes will not 
have binding force against all market participants. In order for them to be binding on TSOs they will have to be adopted 
via contractual agreements among them mirroring, thus, the practice of previous cooperation associations, see C. 
Musialski, op.cit., p. 61. 
53
 See article 6 par. 3 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. 
54
 See article 6 par. 2 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. 
55
 See article 6 par. 4 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. 
56
 See article 6 par. 5 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. 
57
 See article 6 par. 6 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. The ENTSO-E has recently published the “Network Codes 
Development Process” paper defining the characteristics of network codes, the respective roles attributed to each of its 
bodies and describing the development process itself, see ENTSO-E, Network Codes Development Process, 17.02.2012. 
Online. Available: https://www.entsoe.eu/the-association/association-documents/. The respective procedure for 
ENTSO-G is set in article 28 of its Rules of Procedure.  
58
 See ENTSO-G, Press Release. ENTSOG submits first network code to ACER, PR018-12, 06.03.12 final. Online. 
Available : http://www.entsog.eu/publications/index.html. 
59
 See article 6 par. 7 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. 
60
 See article 6 par. 9 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. 
61
 See article 6 par. 10 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. 
62
 See article 23 par. 2 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. It should be noted that article 6 does not prejudice the 
Commission’s right to adopt and amend Guidelines pursuant to article 18 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations, see 
article 6 par. 12 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. 
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Commission has the right not to adopt the network code despite ACER’s recommendation, in which 
case it is under the obligation to state the reasons why
63
. 
The Electricity and Gas Regulations also provide for an alternative institutional route bypassing the 
ENTSOs in their article 6 par. 11, pursuant to which the Commission can adopt one or more network 
codes on its own initiative in case the ENTSOs have failed to develop it or ACER has failed to 
develop a draft network code or upon the recommendation of ACER pursuant to article 6 par. 9 of the 
Electricity and Gas Regulations following a two month period of consultations. The procedure to be 
followed is again the regulatory procedure with scrutiny. This institutional route should, however, be 
understood as an ultimum refugium for resolving eventual blockages, aiming mostly to put pressure on 
the actors to deliver the expected outcome.  
It should be added that the Electricity and Gas Regulations envisage the possibility of an 
amendment of network codes, a procedure which could prove useful in the future in view of eventual 
adaptations to the market or technical evolution in the field and the need for consistency among the 
network codes adopted in related fields themselves or with the Electricity and Gas Target Models. The 
amendment procedure is “simpler, quicker and more flexible64” than the adoption one, the central role 
in it being entrusted to ACER; pursuant to article 7 par. 1 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations, draft 
amendments to network codes may be proposed to it by any person likely to have an interest in it
65
 or 
on ACER’s own initiative. Following consultation with stakeholders, ACER makes reasoned 
proposals to the Commission explaining the consistency of draft amendments with the overall 
objectives of network codes. The Commission may adopt these amendments on non-essential elements 
of the Electricity and Gas Regulations by comitology, without prejudice to further ones it may wish to 
propose. It should be noted that the amendment procedure is established under the Regulations only 
for network codes and not for framework guidelines, the latter being, thus, reviewable only after the 
inclusion of the relevant area in the annual priority list by the Commission. 
Finally, with respect to the recurrent obligation of conducting a consultation with stakeholders, 
article 10 par. 1 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations states that the ENTSOs “shall conduct an 
extensive consultation process, at an early stage and in an open and transparent manner, involving all 
relevant market participants (…)66”. Before the adoption of network codes, the ENTSOs are required 
to indicate how the observations received during the consultation have been taken into consideration 
or state the reasons for the contrary
67
. Both ENTSOs have specified the precise forms such processes 
could take
68
. In practice, however, consultations seem to be put under considerable strain due to the 
tight deadlines set by the Electricity and Gas Regulations and possibly limited resources; both 
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 See article 6 par. 9 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. 
64
 See Fl. Gräper, Ch. Schoser, op.cit., p. 526. 
65
 In an indicative reference, the article mentions the ENTSOs, transmission system operators, network users and 
consumers.  
66
 However, the article does not establish a corollary obligation for stakeholders to participate in the consultation process, 
see C. Musialski, op.cit., p. 46. On consultations, see also ACER, Opinion on the ENTSO-E Statutes, Rules of Procedure 
and List of Members, 05.05.11, p. 6, Opinion on the ENTSO-G Statutes, Rules of Procedure and List of Members, 
05.05.11, p. 7-8. Online. Available: 
 http://www.acer.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ACER_HOME/Public_Docs/Acts%20of%20the%20Agency/Opinions/2011 
67
 See article 10 par. 3 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. 
68
 In addition to the formal consultation processes, the ENTSO-E can have recourse to informal discussions, especially in 
the case of stakeholders that are more directly affected by network codes, and the organization of workshops and 
information forums, see ENTSO-E, Consultation Process, 2011 Edition, 28.06.11, Online. Available: 
https://www.entsoe.eu/the-association/association-documents/. In the case of the ENTSO-G, article 26 of its Rules of Procedure 
distinguishes between formal consultation processes, Stakeholders’ Joint Working Sessions, Stakeholder Support 
Processes and Interactive Data Collection Processes.  
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stakeholders
69
 and ACER
70
 have stressed the need for more extensive and transparent consultations 
from ENTSOs, which would ensure full compliance with the obligation set in the article under 
discussion. Confidentiality issues also represent a source of potential concern during this process, both 
ENTSOs having, however, imposed relevant obligations to their participants
71
. 
The multi-stage procedure presented sets a number of interesting legal questions with respect to the 
legal nature of the acts adopted during its course and the availability of judicial review to which we 
now turn. 
III. Legal characterisation of the acts adopted and availability of judicial review 
The paper has so far focused on the actors involved and the procedure applied for the adoption of 
common network codes. Turning to a more normative dimension, the subsequent analysis will assess 
the legal nature of the acts adopted during this procedure and the availability of judicial review. In this 
respect, the focus will, firstly, be put on the framework guidelines (A) and, secondly, on the network 
codes (B). 
A. Framework Guidelines as Non-reviewable “Preparatory” Acts 
The legal characterization of framework guidelines is not as straightforward as one could imagine; on 
the one hand, the Electricity and Gas Regulations specifically refer to their “non binding” nature72, a 
qualification by law which, however, is not definitive for the assessment of the Court of Justice. Legal 
doctrine, on the other hand, seems to be endorsing the same view but in a somewhat hesitant manner, 
given the requirement of the Electricity and Gas Regulations that network codes be “in line with” 
framework guidelines
73
. The question is far from being insignificant in view of the legal debates that 
may arise from the principles and objectives set by the framework guidelines; an illustrative example 
in this respect are the disputed implications of the provisions of the Capacity Allocation and 
Congestion Management Framework Guidelines on long-term contracts
74
. In this context, it is 
necessary to turn more in detail to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, so as to 
assess whether framework guidelines may be considered as reviewable acts or whether, on the 
contrary, they fall under the category of “preparatory acts” which escape judicial review.  
                                                     
69
 See Eurelectric, Europex, IFIEC, EWEA, Letter to ENTSO-E on the network codes, 02.02.2012. Online. Available: 
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70
 See ACER, Opinion no 01/2012 on ENTSOG’s 2012 Annual Work Programme, Online. Available: 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ACER_HOME/Public_Docs/Acts%20of%20the%20Agency/Opinions/2011 
71
 Compare articles 33 of the ENTSO-G Rules of Procedures and article 35 of the ENTSO-E Internal Regulations, whose 
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claims as confidential, see ENTSO-E Consultation Process, 2011, Edition 28.06.11, p. 6, Online. Available: 
https://www.entsoe.eu/the-association/association-documents/. It should be noted that the breach of confidentiality and 
non-disclosure obligations is treated in a stricter manner in the context of the ENTSO-E, as it could lead to the exclusion 
of the Member or Observer of the Assocation from using its respective rights as appropriate, see article 35 par. 1 of the 
ENTSO-E Internal Regulations. 
72
 See article 6 par. 2 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. 
73
 See St. De Moel, F. Melchior, “Cooperation Between TSOs: Background, Organisation and Netcodes”, in European 
Energy Law Report VIII, M.M. Roggenkamp, Ul. Hammer, Ed. Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland: Intersentia, p. 37. 
74
 See RAUE LLP, “Legal Impact Assessment of the Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms for the 
European Gas Transmission Network”. Online. Available: www.acer.europa.eu, M. Gillis, “Network Codes and 
Compulsory Contract Modification: Framework for Analysis and Case-Study”, in Roundtable-Contracts under Threat, 
FSR EU Energy Law&Policy Workshop, 23.05.12, Online. Available: www.florence-school.eu 
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Following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, article 263 par. 1 TFEU clarifies that the Court of 
Justice of the European Union “shall also review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of 
the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties”. Privileging substance over form75, 
the Court of Justice provides for a definition of the “reviewable act” in its Commission/Council 
judgment, by concluding that an action for annulment must be available for “all measures adopted by 
the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have legal effects
76”. The concept 
of “legal effects” has been subsequently clarified in the International Business Machines 
Corporation/Commission judgment, in which the Court of Justice has specified that a reviewable act is 
“binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change 
in his legal position
77”. 
The question of what constitutes a reviewable act becomes more complex when the act under 
examination is part of a multi-stage procedure before the Commission or involving the Commission, 
national authorities and European agencies. In the above-mentioned International Business Machines 
Corporation/Commission judgment, the Court of Justice concluded that judicial review was possible 
only if the act was “a measure definitively laying down the position of the Commission or the Council 
on the conclusion of that procedure and not a provisional measure intended to pave the way for the 
final decision
78”. With respect to cases involving European agencies, in its Nancy Fern 
Olivieri/Commission and European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products judgment, the 
General Court concluded, when assessing the nature of a revised opinion of the Committee for 
Proprietary Medicinal Products acting for the European Agency for the Medicinal Products (EMEA), 
that the latter was “an intermediate measure whose purpose was to prepare for the marketing 
authorization decision” taken by the Commission and that it, thus, “(did) not definitively lay down the 
Commission’s position79”. In the same vein, a referral by the European Commission to the EMEA 
under the article 30 of the Directive 2001/83/EC, has been considered by the General Court as an act 
setting “in motion the consultative procedure” which “does not definitively determine the position of 
the Commission
80”.  
The General Court, however, acknowledges an exception to the case law when a “preparatory act” 
affects the applicant independently from the final decision
81
; in particular, as the General Court 
stressed in its Pfizer judgment, preparatory acts can be considered as reviewable when, apart from 
having legal effects, they are “in addition (…) themselves the culmination of a special procedure 
distinct from that intended to permit the institution to take a decision on the substance of the case
82”. 
When assessing the case of framework guidelines in view of the case law of the Court of Justice, 
one must therefore examine, firstly, whether they produce certain legal effects and, secondly, whether 
they are the culmination of a “special and distinct” procedure. With respect to the first condition, the 
relationship between framework guidelines and network codes is indeed somewhat ambiguous; despite 
their alleged “non binding” character, article 6 par. 6 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations provides 
                                                     
75
 CFI, Case T-369/03, Arizona Chemical BV and Others / Commission, 14.12.05, ECR 2005.II-05839, par. 56. 
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 ECJ, Case 22-70, Commission / Council, 31.03.71, ECR 1971.00263, par. 42. 
77
 ECJ, Case 60/81, International Business Machines Corporation / Commission, 11.11.81, ECR 1981.02639, par. 9. 
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 ECJ, Case 60/81, International Business Machines Corporation / Commission, 11.11.81, ECR 1981.02639, par. 10, CFI, 
Case T-369/03, Arizona Chemical BV and Others / Commission, 14.12.05, ECR.2005.II-05839, par. 66. 
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 CFI, Case T-326/99, Nancy Fern Olivieri / Commission and European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, 
18.12.03, ECR 2003.II-06053, par. 53. 
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 CFI, Case T-123/03, Pfitzer Ltd / Commission, 02.06.04, ECR 2004.II-01631, par. 26. 
81
 See Al. Türk, Judicial Review in EU Law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publications, 2009, p. 21. 
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 CFI, Case T-123/03, Pfitzer Ltd / Commission, 02.06.04, ECR 2004.II-01631, par. 23 with references to ECJ, Joined 
Cases 8 to 11-66, Société anonyme Cimenteries C.B.R. Cementsbedrjven N.V. and others / Commission, 15.03.67, ECR 
1967.00075, par. 92 and ECJ, Case 60/81, International Business Machines Corporation / Commission, 11.11.81, ECR 
1981.02639, par. 11. 
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that “the Commission shall request the (ENTSOs) to submit a network code which is in line with the 
relevant framework guideline (…)”, the same expression being repeated in the recitals 6 of the 
Electricity Regulation and 15 of the Gas Regulation which add that ACER “should have a role in 
reviewing, based on matters of fact, draft network codes, including their compliance with the 
framework guidelines (…)”. In this sense, framework guidelines do seem to have a de facto binding 
effect when setting the objectives and principles of the network codes, since the latter are expected to 
abide by them. Nevertheless, it is highly doubtful that they constitute by themselves the culmination of 
a special and distinct procedure, since they are part of a whole process, giving ground to a “chain” of 
acts such as the draft network code, the reasoned opinion of the ACER on it, and, finally, the network 
code itself which is adopted by comitology. In terms of legal certainty, of course, a judgment of the 
Court of Justice definitively clarifying the legal nature of these acts, which are novel in EU energy 
regulation, would be welcome in the future. 
As it has been rightly stressed, the absence of judicial review at this specific stage necessarily puts 
additional focus on the very same process that suffers under timeliness considerations, namely the 
consultations prior to the adoption of framework guidelines
83
. However, it does not result, in parallel, 
in an absolute gap in judicial control; the rationale of the availability of judicial review against the 
final act in a multi-stage procedure lies in the efficiency and timeliness gains that can be achieved, but 
not at the expense of judicial review altogether. On the contrary, according to settled case law any 
legal defects of a preparatory act “may be relied upon in an action directed against the definitive act 
for which they represent a preparatory step
84”. In this sense, the legal defects of framework guidelines 
can be invoked against the network codes that constitute the final outcome of the procedure. It is to 
them that we now turn.  
B. Common Network Codes as Legally Binding Reviewable Acts 
As it has been previously noted, network codes are market and technical rules which, by themselves, 
do not produce binding force. They are vested with the latter through their formal adoption by 
comitology from the Commission, a procedure that bears advantages in terms of adaptability, 
flexibility and timeliness compared to the adoption by formal legislation.  
In particular, article 23 par. 1 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations defines the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny (RPS procedure) as the applicable one. The latter affords more control –
without it being equal to that of the Council- to the European Parliament than in the past with respect 
to delegation involving the amendment or supplementation of non-essential elements of “sensitive” 
secondary legislation in case of basic acts adopted by co-decision
85
. The procedure relies on two levels 
of control, namely, the Regulatory Committee control and the control by the two legislators
86
 
depending on the initial position of the Regulatory Committee.  
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 See St. De Moel, F. Melchior, op.cit., p. 37. 
84
 CFI, Case T-123/03, Pfitzer Ltd / Commission, 02.06.04, ECR 2004.II-01631, par. 24. 
85
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One of the interesting questions arising from the use of the RPS procedure for the final adoption of 
network codes relates to the transition from comitology
87
 to the new regime of delegated and 
implementing acts established under articles 290 and 291 TFEU following the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty
88
. Of particular interest with respect to network codes, delegated acts are “non-legislative acts 
of general application” which supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative 
act
89
. Contrasted with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny, the new regime implicates, firstly, the 
absence of a general horizontal framework regarding the objectives, scope, duration and conditions to 
which delegation is subject, each legislative act defining them explicitly on a case-by-case basis
90
. 
Secondly, it is characterized by the absence of comitology committees
91
. Thirdly, both the Council and 
the European Parliament have a right of opposition to an individual delegated act, from now on, on 
any grounds. Finally, a novel right of revocation of the delegation altogether is entrusted to both 
legislators
92
. Contrary to implementing acts, the transition to delegated acts is not automatic; the 
effects of the RPS procedure are maintained for the purposes of existing basic acts making reference to 
it
93
, such as the Electricity and Gas Regulations, until the latter are revised, a process which the 
Commission envisages to complete altogether for basic acts referring to this procedure by 2014
94
. 
Given their nature as “non legislative acts of general application” delegated acts can, in principle, 
take the form of a secondary Regulation, Directive or Decision
95
. The specific legal instrument that 
will be used for network codes is not specified in the Electricity and Gas Regulations. Nevertheless, 
network codes should normally be adopted as EU Regulations, an instrument capable of ensuring 
speed and effectiveness in its implementation given its distinct characteristics: legally binding force, 
direct applicability to market participants without the need for a lengthy transposition as in the case of 
EU directives, and primacy over national arrangements. Regarding the last characteristic, pursuant to 
article 8 par. 7 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations, the network codes are adopted with respect to 
“cross-border network issues” and “market integration issues” and do not prejudice the right of 
Member States to establish national rules not affecting cross-border trade. However, a “spill-over” 
effect of the common network codes on national arrangements, ultimately forcing Member States to 
change the latter, cannot be excluded
96
. It should, also, be noted that network codes are binding on the 
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territory of the European Union
97
; in this respect, binding force on third countries would require the 
adoption of specific instruments of international law
98
. 
In terms of direct judicial review, common network codes adopted as EU regulations will evidently 
constitute “reviewable acts” under article 263 par. 1 TFEU according to the previously analyzed case 
law. A further question relates to the possibility of judicial review through proceedings instituted by 
private applicants, such as for example TSOs, in view of the changes brought about by the Lisbon 
Treaty with respect to the standing of non-privileged applicants. In particular, article 263 par. 4 TFEU 
currently provides for judicial review against an act addressed to non privileged applicants or “which 
is of direct and individual concern” to them and against a “regulatory act which is of direct concern to 
them and does not entail implementing measures”. The question is, thus, reformulated into whether 
judicial review against network codes adopted as EU Regulations is available under both restrictive 
conditions of direct and individual concern or whether they fall under the category of “regulatory 
acts”, for which the latter condition is relaxed99.  
In this respect, it should be stressed that “regulatory acts” fit rather uneasily with the formalistic 
hierarchy of norms established under the Lisbon Treaty between legislative, delegated and 
implementing acts; legal doctrine admits their exact content is a source of ambiguity, depending on the 
broad or narrower interpretation to be adopted
100
. In its first judgment on this question the General 
Court has, by virtue of a literal, historical and teleological interpretation, concluded that the term refers 
to “all acts of general application apart from legislative acts101”. This approach is not exempt to 
criticism since counter-arguments can be raised claiming a formalistic vision resulting in a mere a 
contrario definition of the category and persisting gaps in the judicial protection on an EU level
102
. 
However, both this initial case law of the General Court and the various interpretations envisaged by 
legal doctrine confirm that non-legislative measures of general application adopted as EU Regulations, 
such as the future network codes, are to be considered as “regulatory acts103”. 
With respect to the condition of a “direct concern” also required under article 263 par. 4 TFEU, in 
its recent Microban International Ltd and Microban (Europe) Ltd / Commission judgment, the General 
Court has clarified that it is to be interpreted in the same manner both under the general and the 
specific legal standing conditions
104
. In that sense, non privileged applicants turning against network 
codes adopted as EU Regulations will have to prove that the measure directly affects their legal 
situation and that its implementation is purely automatic and results from EU rules alone without the 
application of other intermediate rules
105
. In the same judgment, faced with a direct prohibition of a 
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chemical substance, the General Court has also concluded that the final condition of the absence of 
implementing measures was fulfilled
106
. The facts of the case having been quite straightforward in this 
respect, further clarifications will need to be provided from case law with respect to the precise 
content of this last condition
107
. In conclusion, direct judicial review against network codes adopted as 
EU regulations for non-privileged applicants should follow the more flexible variant for regulatory 
acts introduced by the Lisbon Treaty provided the rest of the above-mentioned conditions are fulfilled.  
In what the Court of Justice has consistently described as “a complete system of legal remedies and 
procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of acts of the institutions
108”, private 
parties may also have recourse to indirect means of judicial review against EU network codes and, 
especially, to references for a preliminary ruling on their validity under article 267 TFEU in the event 
of actions filed before national courts
109
.  
The relationship between the two means of review is governed by the Textilwerke Deggendorf 
(TWD) case law, which precludes whomever –addressee or third party- had undoubtedly the right to 
challenge an EU act within the time-limit set by article 263 par. 6 TFEU to plead the illegality of this 
act in proceedings before national courts
110
, provided he had the opportunity to learn of the contested 
measure and of his having legal standing against it
111
. The TWD case law has been found to apply to 
EU Regulations
112
, despite the notorious difficulties in “undoubtedly” establishing a direct and 
individual concern for non-privileged applicants under the pre-Lisbon regime. The Court of Justice has 
proceeded to its expansive application in its Nachi Europe HmbH judgment by concluding that an 
anti-dumping regulation could become definitive against an individual “in regard to whom it must be 
considered to be an individual decision and who could undoubtedly have sought its annulment under 
Article (263 TFEU)
113”. However, the relaxation of the conditions for legal standing under the new 
variant of article 263 par. 4 TFEU discussed above seems to refuel the debate as to the extent of the 
applicability of this case law
114
.  
With regard to the powers and obligations of national courts, article 267 TFEU distinguishes 
between courts or tribunals of a Member State
115
 whose decisions are subject to a judicial remedy 
under national law and those where no such remedy exists; the former may, if they consider that a 
decision on the question is necessary to enable them to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to 
give a ruling thereon while the latter are obliged to do so. Regardless of whether they fall under article 
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267 par. 2 or 3 TFEU, national courts will be precluded from declaring EU network codes invalid, 
pursuant to the Foto-Frost case-law, due to the need to ensure the uniformity and coherence of EU 
law
116
; on the contrary, they can consider their validity concluding that they are indeed valid and 
rejecting opposite grounds as unfounded
117
. As confirmed in the Zuckerfabrik
118
 and Atlanta
119
 
judgments, national courts will be able to grant interim relief against EU network codes in proceedings 
before them if they are persuaded that serious doubts exist as to their validity. 
As regards the powers of the Court of Justice, pursuant to article 267 par. 1 TFEU, it has 
jurisdiction to give “preliminary rulings concerning: a) the interpretation of the Treaties; b) the validity 
and interpretation of acts of the institutions, offices or agencies of the Union”, which, obviously, also 
concerns EU Regulations. The review entrusted to the Court of Justice when assessing the validity of 
EU network codes will be conducted only in light of the grounds referred to it by the national court
120
 
employing the same grounds of review as in actions for annulment under article 263 TFEU
121
. An 
eventual declaration of invalidity of an EU network code under article 267 TFEU will be binding on 
the referring national court and, for the needs of the uniform application of EU law and legal certainty, 
will constitute “sufficient reason for any other national court to regard that act as void for the purposes 
of a judgment which it has to give
122”. At the same time any EU institution concerned will be expected 
to take all necessary measures to comply with the judgment
123
. 
Despite the absence of a right to remedy for individuals
124
 and the limitations in the effectiveness 
of the judicial protection afforded to them against measures of general application
125
, preliminary 
references constitute an important indirect means of judicial review for EU network codes to be 
considered by non-privileged applicants against EU network codes. 
IV. Conclusions  
The aim of this paper has been to assess the legal nature of the acts involved in the adoption procedure 
of network codes and the subsequent availability of judicial review. In this respect, it first provided an 
analysis of the current legislative framework by initially identifying the substantial progress marked 
under the Electricity and Gas Regulations with respect to the cooperation of TSOs within the 
ENTSOs, mainly responsible for the elaboration of network codes. At the same time, the actual 
procedure for the adoption of network codes has been critically assessed as an adequate framework for 
                                                     
116
 ECJ, Case 314/85, Foto-Frost / Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, 22.10.87, ECR 1987.4199. 
117
 ECJ, Case 314/85, Foto-Frost / Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, 22.10.87, ECR 1987.4199. 
118
 ECJ, Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG / Hauptzollamt Itzehoe and Zuckerfabrik 
Soest GmbH v Hauptzollamt Paderborn, ECR 1991.I-415. 
119
 ECJ, Case C-465/93, Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH and others / Bundersamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, 
ECR 1995.I-3761. 
120
 ECJ, Case C-305/05, Ordre des Barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others / Conseil des ministres, 26.06.07, 
ECR 2007.I-5305. 
121
 ECJ, Joined Cases 21 to 24-72, International Fruit Company NV and others / Produjtschap voor Groenten en Fruit, 
12.12.72, ECR 1972.1219. 
122
 ECJ, Case 66/80, SpA International Chemical Corporation / Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato, 13.05.81, ECR 
1981.1191, par. 13. The Court of Justice has, however, clarified that further references in relation to an act declared void 
by the Court may be made “in particular if questions arise as to the grounds, the scope and possibly the consequences of 
the invalidity established earlier”. 
123
 ECJ, Joined cases 117-76, 16-77, Albert Ruckdeschel&Co. And Hansa-Lagerhaus Stroh&Co. / Hauptzollamt Hamburg-
St. Annen, Diamalt AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe, ECR 1977.1753. 
124
 See footnote 109. 
125
 See Al. Turk, op.cit., pp. 231-237. 
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the final adoption of network codes, taking advantage of the particular strengths of each implicated 
actor but being put under considerable strain under tight deadlines.  
Subsequently, the analysis shifted towards the examination of the legal characterization of the acts 
adopted in the course of the procedure. In this respect, the paper reached the conclusion that 
framework guidelines should be considered as non-reviewable preparatory acts. On the contrary, 
network codes are the definitive acts of the procedure, drawing their legally binding nature from their 
formal adoption by comitology from the Commission most probably in the form of an EU regulation, 
and subject to direct and indirect means of judicial review as analyzed.  
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